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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CARRIERS - PERSONS LIABLE FOR CHARGES - LIABILITY OF A CoNSIGNE
WHO RECONSIGNS wITH DIRECTIONS TO COLLECT CHARGES FROM RECONSIGNEE.
-The defendant corporation, consignee for five cars of gasoline shipped
over the plaintiff railroad by uniform bill of lading in which the consignor
had executed the standard clause excusing himself from liability for the
charges, reconsigned the cars before arrival, directing the plaintiff by
letter to deliver to the reconsignee on payment of freight charges. The
plaintiff delivered on credit, releasing its lien, and, on subsequent failure
of the reconsignee to pay its account, sued the original consignee. The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held for
the defendant,1 accepting its contentions that reconsignment was not
such an act of acceptance as to show ownership with attendant liability
and that its directions to the carrier imposed a duty on the carrier to col-
lect the charges from the reoonsignee as directed. The theory of a con-
trary New York case,2 to the effect that (1) the act of reconsignment
1 New York Central Railroad Co. v. Transamerican Petroleum Corp., 108 F.,
(2d) 994 (1939).
2 New York Central Railroad Co. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N.Y. 261,
137 N.E. 324, 24 A.L.R. 1160 (1922).
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amounted to acceptance, which raised a presumption of ownership in the
defendant consignor, so that it then entered into the contract expressed
in the bill of lading under which the consignee was to pay the charges,
and (2) the carrier was not bound by the direction of the consignee to
collect before delivery to the reconsignee, since in this transaction the
consignee stood in the position of the consignor, and such instruction by a
consignor is treated as an option to collect rather than a contractual obli-
gation to collect from the consignee, is expressly rejected by the court
in the instant case.
Since the rules governing liability in the consignor-consignee rela-
tion are applied as the basis for liability in the consignee-reconsignee re-
lation, an examination of them is pertinent to a discussion of the principal
decision. Liability of the consignor depends upon his contract with the
carrier, but a direction to collect charges from the consignee is con-
sidered to be for the benefit of the carrier, unless this stipulation is such
as to amount to an express agreement. 3 The direction is considered to be
in recognition of the carrier's right to retain the shipment until his lien is
satisfied. Under the revised form of the Uniform Domestic Bill of Lading
as amended August 1, 1930, however, the consignor can protect himself
by executing a stipulation on the face of the bill that the shipment must
not be delivered without payment of all lawful charges. Execution of this
clause leaves the consignor liable only on his implied warranty that the
consignee will accept the shipment.
4
In cases where the consignee accepts physical possession of the goods
his liability is generally conceded, with certain exceptions. 5 This li-
ability is based on an implied contract-the consignee's promise to pay,
based on the consideration in giving up its lien.6 Or it is implied from the
acceptance under a bill of lading which specifies that charges are to be
paid by him.7 And liability is also raised from the inference of ownership
in the consignee as manifested by his acceptance of them.
8
As to charges accrued up to the point of redirection, the consignee
who reconsigns with directions to collect from the reconsignee is treated
in similar manner with the ordinary consignee by most of the courts
which hold him liable, in the absence of clear and unmistakable direc-
tions to the carrier showing facts sufficient to remove the presumption of
3 Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis R. Co. v. Southern Coal & Coke Co, 147 Tenn. 433,
248 S.W. 297 (1923); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marcelletti, 256 Mich. 411, 240 N.W.
4, 78 A.L.R. 923 (1932).
4 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Southern Coal, Coke & Mining Co., 254 Ill. App. 238
(1929), cert. denied 282 U.S. 860, 51 S. Ct. 34, 75 L.Ed. 761 (1930).
5 As where consignee accepts with notice to carrier that he accepts as agent
only.
6 Union Pacific R. Co. v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 202 F. 720 at
723 (1912).
7 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, 267 U.S. 395, 45 S. Ct. 233, 69 L.Ed. 678,
(1925); see also notes, 24 A.L.R. 1163 at 1167; 78 A.L.R. 926 at 929.
8 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. Louis R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 40 S. Ct. 27, 63
L.Ed. 1151 (1919); New York C. R. Co. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N.Y. 261,
137 N.E. 324, 24 A.L.R. 1160 (1922).
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ownership. Since the carrier has not given up its lien by accepting the
reconsignment order, it is plain that one ground for raising an implied
promise to pay has failed. The cases which analyze the relationship,
then, base the implied promise to pay on the mere fact of ownership.9
This may be actual or apparent-raised from the act of reconsignment
by the consignee, which act is construed as evidence of ownership mak-
ing the consignee contractually liable under the terms of the bill of
lading.10 Since this ownership is implied from the fact of reconsignment,
founding an implied promise on this sometimes results in the mounting
of a presumption on a presumption, a very strained result."
As to the charges accruing subsequent to the act of reconsignment,
courts which hold the consignee liable do so by applying to this situation
the rules governing the liability of a consignor 12-again exempting him
from liability where he has clearly demonstrated to the carrier that he is
not the owner. As we have seen, the direction of a consignor to a carrier to
deliver and collect charges is treated, except where it is an executed
stipulation in a bill of lading, as an option in the carrier which he is not
bound to follow. The result is that under this theory, though the con-
signor can protect himself, the reconsigning consignee cannot, since he
does not execute a bill of lading.
13
Cases which hold for the consignee in regard to charges accrued up
to the point of reconsignment do so on the ground (1) that the consignee
was not in fact the owner and that the carrier had no right to believe
that he was, as where the bill of lading shows that he is not,14 or (2) that
reconsignment was not such acceptance as could raise a presumption of
ownership. 15 Courts which have extended this freedom from liability to
9 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lord & Spencer, 3 N.E. (2d) 231, 105 A.L.R. 1211
(Mass., 1936); see also note, 105 A.L.R. 1216; New York C. R. Co. v. Platt &
Brahms Coal Co., 236 Ill. App. 150 (1925).
10 N. Y. C. R. Co. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N.Y. 261, 137 N.E. 324, 24
A.L.R. 1160 (1922); see also note, 105 A.L.R. 1216.
11 Davis v. Allen, 124 S.C. 297, 117 S.E. 547 (1923).
12 N. Y. C. R. Co. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N.Y. 261, 137 N.E. 324, 24
A.L.R. 1160 (1922); Pere Marquette R. Co. v. American Coal & Supply Co., 239
Ill. App. 139 (1925).
"3 It is interesting to note the language of the court in Dare v. N. Y. C. R. Co.,
20 F. (2d) 379 (1927): "There must be some effective substitution by novation, or
otherwise, so that the new debtor would become legally bound to the carrier for
freight before the consignee is freed."
14 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Southern Coal, Coke and Mining Co., 254 Ill. App.
238 (1929); Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis R. Co. v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 147
Tenn. 433, 248 S.W. 297 (1923). Even under the New York rule, where the carrier
knows that the consignee is not the owner, consignee who reconsigns will not be
liable. Merian v. Funck, 4 Denio (N.Y) 110 (1847), where goods were shipped
under a bill of lading directing shipment to the consignee or his order. St. Louis
Southwestern R. Co. v. Browne Grain Co., 166 S.W. 40 (Tex. Civ. App., 1914),
where the shipment was under a bill of lading containing a stipulation that "the
owner or consignee" should pay the freight, the court holding that "owner"
meant owner at time of delivery.
15 Pere Marquette R. Co. v. American Coal and Supply Co., 239 Ill. App. 139
(1925); Union P. R, Co. v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 202 F. 720 (1912).
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charges following the reconsignment, have, as a rule, not recognized any
difference between these two types of charges but have indicated that,
since the consignee is not the owner, the rules covering the consignor's
liability cannot be applied to the consignee but rather that liability is to
be determined from the terms of the contract embodied in the reconsign-
ment order.16 One case has held that although the consignee was not the
owner so as to be held for charges to the point of reconsignment, the re-
consignment order amounted to a contract by which the carrier under-
took to collect the charges on delivery of the shipment.17
The court in the instant case chose to attack the fundamental basis
for imposing liability on the consignee-the application of the rules gov-
erning the consignor-consignee relation to the reconsigning consignee.
The court refused to presume such unconditional acceptance by the con-
signee as to show ownership from the act of reconsignment, pointing out
that the main reason for raising such a presumption-that acceptance
was consideration for the carrier's releasing its lien-had failed. The
court does not negative the rule that reconsignment is acceptance, but
seems to indicate that, even if it be held to be acceptance, there is no
reason to raise the implied promise to pay. That this construction might
not have been intended, however, is indicated by the fact that the court
found support in the stipulation that at the time of delivery the defendant
was not the owner. On the other hand, the court stated that its interpreta-
tion of the contract of carriage was that charges were to be collected upon
actual delivery and not from the consignee "merely because during the
course of transit it might perform some act construed to be a conditional
acceptance."
The court also held that a contractual relation was created by the
reconsignment order, rejecting the interpretation that the direction was
an option only. This seems to be a recognition of the fact that, since the
reconsigning consignee cannot protect himself as the consignor can by
executing a clause in the bill of lading, the policy which dictated the in-
clusion of this clause in the bill to overcome the harshness of the "option"
rule will be extended in aid of such consignee.
It would seem unnecessary for the court to hold both that there is a
duty created in the carrier by the bill of lading to collect from the
ultimate recipient and that there is also a duty created by the contract
with the consignee-and in addition that such duty is created by law. It
is suggested that the principle of the instant decision would be susceptible
to more ready acceptance in other courts were the legal basis for this
duty more definitely established. For example, it might be found in the
bailment relation of the simple contract of carriage wherein the carrier
undertakes to deliver the shipment and collect therefor in consideration
of the consignee's promise, implied from the reconsignment order, that
16 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Southern Coal, Coke and Mining Co., 254 Ill. App.
238 (1929).
17 Pere Marquette R. Co. v. American Coal & Supply Co., 239 Ill. App. 139 (1925).
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it would guarantee acceptance of the shipment by the reconsignee and in
default thereof make good all charges. Perhaps the simplest construction
would be to construe the original carriage contract as requiring collec-
tion not necessarily from the consignee named in the bill of lading but
from the actual recipient of the shipment. The court suggested but did not
definitely accept this theory. This would be no hardship on the carrier,
who had under the original contract of carriage but one person to hold for
charges anyway. Or, in analogy to the situation created by assignment
by a bailor of his interest in warehoused goods, subject to charges, it
could be held that the carrier like the warehouseman must exercise his
lien and collect charges on delivery or be estopped from seeking to col-
lect them from the original bailor. It cannot sensibly be contended that
this is too great a burden to put on the carrier, and there is actually less
chance for discrimination here than where the carrier is allowed to treat
the direction to collect as an option. As the court said in the instant case,
to allow the carrier to treat the direction to collect charges as an option
would allow the carrier to safely extend credit to the reconsignee, since
he had the consignee to fall back on, whereas he could not safely extend
credit to a consignee who actually received the shipment, since the con-
signor can prevent recourse upon himself by executing the stipulation in
the bill of lading.
The importance of this case lies in the fact that the court suggests
that although the consignee might be considered as having assumed own-
ership by the reconsignment order, a simple direction to the carrier is
sufficient to relieve him of this liability. The weakness of the case, viewed
in the light of its influence on future decisions, lies in the fact that the
court has not placed the duty of the carrier to observe this direction on a
clearly defined legal basis. This would seem to be necessary if the case
is to influence the courts which have indicated that an actual novation
would be necessary to relieve the consignee of liability.
D. G. MACDONALD
CONTRACTs-CoNsmucTIoN-RIGHTs OF TmD PARTY BENEFICARIES AS
CONTROLLED BY TERMS or CONTRACT.-In a contract to purchase land from
the United States, the defendant agreed to pay all taxes and assess-
ments levied on the land by the plaintiff borough. The contract also con-
tained a provision whereby all rights of action on the contract were to
be reserved to the United States Shipping Board, which held title to the
property. Plaintiff sought to recover back taxes on the ground that it
was a third party beneficiary to the contract. The Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey, in affirming dismissal of the suit, agreed that
performance of the contract would be a benefit to the plaintiff, but pointed
out that, by the express terms of the contract, all rights of action for
breach of the contract were reserved to the United States, and, therefore,
intention to benefit the plaintiff was lacking.'
The doctrine of third party beneficiary contracts requires little
I Borough of Brooklawn v. Brooklawn Housing Corp., 11 A. (2d) 83 (N.J., 1940).
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enlargement here. The fundamental doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox2 is still
the base from which all interpretation and construction must start.
There must be a valid contract between the parties made with the intent
to benefit or create a legal obligation in favor of a third person. It is
only after such rights have come into being by virtue of the contract
itself that the law furnishes the remedy by allowing such third party
to sue direct. This intention need not be an intention to benefit, but it
must be an intention by the promisor to assume a legal obligation to
the beneficiary.3 Therefore, beneficiaries, even if otherwise parties to
the contract, acquire no better right than the contract gives them. A
provision stating that the contract was made for the benefit of another,
or that such other person should have a right of action, would clearly
indicate the necessary intention; conversely, a provision such as the
one in the instant case, clearly shows an intent to exclude such third
party from acquiring any rights under the contract.
In the instant case, counsel for the plaintiff attacked the clause be-
cause of the motive and purpose behind the exclusion clause. Such a line
of reasoning seeks to substitute the subjective intention of the parties for
the intention which is clearly shown by the wording of the contract itself.
The doctrine that the rights of third party beneficiaries arise out of and
are controlled by the terms of the contract is by no means new,4 but
the decision in the instant case seems to provide a safe method for
avoiding needless litigation. C. G. DOYLE
CRimINAL LAw-WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NoBis-RIGHT OF TRIAL COURT TO
SET AsIDE CONVICTION AFTER AFFIRMANCE ON APPEAL.-The Illinois Supreme
Court, in the case of People v. Dabbs1 decided that a motion in the nature
of a writ of error coram nobis 2 will lie to set aside a conviction notwith-
2 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
3 Carson Pirie Scott & Co., v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498, 81 A.L.R.
1262 (1931); Ochs v. M. J. Carnahan Co, 42 Ind. App. 157, 76 N.E. 788 (1906);
Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 262, 125 So. 55, 77 A.L.R. 13 (1929).
4 Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931); Byram
Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 A. 293 (1929); Knapp v. Heid-
ritter Lumber Co., 99 N.J. Eq. 381, 131 A. 909 (1926).
1 372 Ill. 160, 23 N.E. (2d) 343 (1939).
2 In common law days, both in civil and criminal cases, a remedy by writ of
error coram nobis was provided wherever by a judgment obtained by duress or
fraud, or where by some excusable mistake or ignorance of the accused and
without negligence on his part, he has been deprived of a defense which he could
have used on his trial and which, if known to the court would have led to the
opposite result. 2 R.C.L. 307, §262; People v. Green, 355 Il. 468, 189 N.E. 500
(1934); People v. Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 157 N.E. 218 (1927); People v. Bruno, 346
Ill. 449, 179 N.E. 129, (1931); People v. Long, 346 Ill. 646, 178 N.E. 918 (1931).
Such was also the case in the early days in Illinois. Mitchell v. King, 187 Inl. 452,
58 N.E. 367 (1900); Sloo v. State Bank of Illinois, 1 Scam. (Ill.) 428 (1837);
People v. Drysch, 311 Ill. 342, 143 N.E. 100 (1924). In 1872 the writ of error coram
nobis [use of which was available for twenty years after judgment, People v.
Murphy, 296 IM. 532, 129 N.E. 868 (1921)] was abolished by statute in civil cases
and the present method of motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis
was substituted and made available for only five years after judgment (Ill. Ses-
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standing the prior affirmance of the judgment by the Supreme Court on
appeal therefrom. Dabbs was convicted of an infamous crime against
nature, and on appeal his conviction had been affirmed. 3 Eight months
later he filed his petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis in
the trial court, relying on the alleged concealment by the State's Attorney
of the fact that the sole witness of the state was not sane at the time he
testified. From a finding by the trial court that such was not the case,
he appealed. The State's Attorney moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that no further review was possible after the conviction had once
been reviewed. The Supreme Court held that such was not the law, though
affirming the trial court's ruling on the facts.
The court pointed out that a motion in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis is really the filing of a new suit, is civil in nature, 4 and
does not constitute a direct attack on the original judgment; hence the
problem does not come within the inherent power of the court to protect
its appellate jurisdiction by preventing further review thereof. In this
respect, the earlier cases forbidding subsequent review of an affirmed
conviction by the use of habeas corpus are distinguishable in principle.
5
The use of the writ of error coram nobis as a device to correct
errors of fact after a conviction has been affirmed has been questioned
in only a few jurisdictions and the decisions are not wholly uniform.
In Indiana it was held in Partlow v. State6 that the writ comes too late
after affirmance of the conviction, the court stating that the writ would
not lie in England 7 in the same situation; and they felt they were gov-
erned by such precedents. Kentucky, in the case of Robertson v. Com-
sion Laws 1872, 338, §66). In the Practice Act of 1907, Section 89, and again in
1933, this newer remedy was carried over into the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, §196), which by its terms is confined to civil cases (Ch. 110,
§125), the old law having been repealed. No comparable statute was ever adopted
in regard to criminal cases, though the Illinois Supreme Court has apparently
asserted in a number of criminal cases that the older remedy is now gone and
the modern substitute in civil cases applies alike to criminal prosecutions on the
theory that the proceeding is civil in nature. People v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189
N.E. 500 (1934); People v. Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 157 N.E. 218 (1927).
3 People vs. Dabbs, 370 Ill. 378, 19 N.E. (2d) 175 (1939).
4 People v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N.E. 500 (1934).
5 People v. Circuit Ct. of Will County, 369 Ill. 438, 17 N.E. (2d) 46 (1938); People
v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84 N.E. 875 (1908).
6 194 Ind. 172, 141 N.E. 513, 30 A.L.R. 1414 (1923).
7 The English cases relied on by the court and others appearing in the books
were all civil cases. Lambell v. Pretty John, 2 Strange 690, 93 Eng. Rep. 786
(1726); Home v. Bushell, 2 Strange 950, 93 Eng. Rep. 961 (1733); Burleigh v.
Harris, 2 Strange 975, 93 Eng. Rep. 978 (1734); Prior v..... ,1 Ventris 208,
86 Eng. Rep. 140 (1684); Hopkins v. Prior and Riglesworth, 3 Keble 28, 84
Eng. Rep. 576 (1673); Hopkins and Prior v. Weigglesworth, 2 Lev. 39, 83 Eng.
Rep. 443 (1673). The reason that such practice does not appear to have arisen
in criminal cases prior to the settlement of the Americas was probably because
of the difficulty of securing appellate review in the first instance. Holdsworth,
History of England, I, 215. It is hardly likely, then, that there would be much
chance for the subsequent use in England of the writ of error coram nobis after
an affirmance.
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monwealth8 followed with approval the stand taken by Indiana, and
Washington has also followed this strict interpretation. Other jurisdic-
tions illustrating a trend toward greater liberality permit the use of the
motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis provided the con-
sent of the appellate court that affirmed the conviction is secured. 10
Prior to the present decision in Illinois, Mississippi was the only state
in the Union to allow the writ as a matter of right, resting the decision on
the same grounds as those presented by the instant case.11 One state,
California, has heard such cases apparently without questioning the
propriety of the action taken, though in each instance the proceedings
have been unsuccessful from the standpoint of the defendant.' 2 It would
seem that this relief should be allowed in a proper case, as the matter
relied upon will not appear in the appellate record, and it cannot,
therefore, be claimed that the prior appellate proceedings have already
given the convicted person his day in court. L. LEnEs
DAMAGES-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTIEs-APPLIcABzLrrY OF PRo-
VISION FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN THE COMPLETION OF CONTRACTUAL
PERFORMANCE WHERE PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN ABANDONED.-The Clemente
Construction Corporation and the P. T. Cox Contracting Company, In-
corporated entered a contract whereby the construction corporation was
to complete certain work by May 6, 1936. The contract contained a liqui-
dated damages clause which provided that, if the construction corpora-
tion should not complete the work by May 6, 1936, it would pay to the
contracting company the sum of $150 for each day (Sundays and legal
holidays excepted) that the work remained incomplete and unfinished.
Work was begun February 20, 1935, and continued until December 31,
1935, when the construction corporation ceased all performance of the
contract. On January 3, 1936, the contracting company engaged another
construction firm, which completed the work on November 9, 1936. In a
suit by the construction corporation against the contracting company'
for work done before the plaintiff abandoned performance, the defendant
successfully counterclaimed for (1) the amount which it paid for com-
pletion of the work in excess of the amount stipulated in the contract to
be paid to the plaintiff, and (2) the amount named in the liquidated
damages clause of the abandoned contract.
8 279 Ky. 762, 132 S.W. (2d) 69 (1939); Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779,
108 S.W. (2d) 816 (1937).
9 Wilson v. State, 46 Wash. 416, 90 P. 257 (1907).
10 State v. Hudspeth, 191 Ark. 963, 88 S.W. (2d) 858 (1935); Hydrick v. State,
103 Ark. 4, 145 S.W. 542 (1912); Land v. Williams, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 362, 51
Am. Dec. 117 (1849); Strang v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 820 (1931); Washington
v. State, 92 Fla. 740, 110 So. 259 (1926); House v. State, 130 Fla. 400, 177 So. 705
(1937); Lamb v. State, 91 Fla. 396, 107 So. 535 (1926); State v. Stanley, 225 Mo.
525, 125 S.W. 475 (1910).
21 Buckler v. State, 173 Miss. 350, 161 So. 683 (1935).
12 People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 232 P. 457 (1924); People v. Kelly, 96 P. (2d) 372
(Cal., 1939).
1 Clemente Const. Corp. v. P. T. Cox Contracting Co., Inc., 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 483
(1939).
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In thus enforcing a liquidated damages clause of an abandoned con-
tract, the decision is contrary to the law of New York2 and numerous
decisions of courts throughout the United States. These decisions are
based upon the courts' ascertainment of the intention of the contracting
parties. The courts, in refusing to give effect to such a clause when per-
formance of the entire contract has been abandoned, base their deci-
sions upon the view that the parties do not contemplate an absolute
abandonment of the work, that the sine qua non of the applicability of
the liquidated damages clause for delay is the completion of the work
by the obligor, and that the per diem allowance is not to be paid in lieu of
performance but upon performance after the time fixed in the agree-
ment.
It would seem that the foregoing constitutes an accurate interpreta-
tion of the intention revealed by the words of the liquidated damages
clauses of construction contracts generally used. To bind the obligor to
completion of the work by a certain date, and then to stipulate for the
payment of a per diem sum as damages for each day that the work re-
mains unfinished beyond that date can be commonly understood to
mean "for each day that the work remains unfinished as a result of the
slowness of the obligor in doing his work." An intention to bind the
obligor to the payment of the per diem sum after he has abandoned the
contract, when the work is no longer in his control, would, presumably,
be manifested in words more directly designed to embrace the contin-
gency of total abandonment.
In Village of Canton v. Globe Indemnity Company4 the court pointed
out that it would be anomalous to permit an owner to recover liquidated
damages for delays in the completion of a contract which the owner
itself completed. Nor, in the court's view, is it persuasive of a different
result that the owner has prosecuted the contract to completion without
any unnecessary delay. For, the court holds, the provision for liquidated
damages must be construed, not in the light of the fact that there has
been no unnecessary delay by the owner, but in the light of possibilities
permitted by such construction; most significantly in the light of the
constant temptation for the owner not to hasten the work to completion.
2 As expressed in Gallagher v Baird, 66 N.Y.S. 759 (1900), affirmed without
opinion in 170 N.Y. 566, 62 N.E. 1095 (1902); Murphy v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 91 N.Y.S. 582 (1905), affirmed without opinion in 184 N.Y. 543, 76
N.E. 1101 (1906); Village of Canton v. Globe Indemnity Co., 195 N.Y.S. 445 (1922).
3 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Robertson, 136 Ala. 379, 34 So. 933 (1903); Shields v.
John Shields Const. Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 286, 86 A. 958 (1913); Moses v. Autuono, 56
Fla. 499, 47 So. 925, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 350 (1908); Light, Heat & Water Co. v. City
of Jackson, 73 Miss. 598, 19 So. 771 (1895); Bacigalupi v. Phoenix Bldg. and Const
Co., 14 Cal. App. 632, 112 P. 892 (1910); Gillett v. Young, 45 Colo. 562, 101 P. 766
(1909) ; Garey v. City of Pasco, 89 Wash. 382, 154 P. 433 (1916) ; Moore v. Board of
Regents, 215 Mo. 705, 115 S.W. 6 (1908); Burke Const. Co. v. Board of Improvement
of Paving Dist. No. 20, 161 Ark. 433, 256 S.W. 850 (1923) ; City of Rainier v. Masters,
79 Or. 534, 154 P. 426, L.R.A. 1916E, 1179 (1916); Mason v. Continental Supply Co.,
99 Okla. 32, 225 P. 381 (1924). Also see 3 Williston Contracts (rev. ed. 1936), 1785.
4 195 N.Y.S. 445 (1922).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In the case under examination, Justice Pecora attempts to support
his position with two New York cases, 5 both of which antedate Village
of Canton v. Globe Indemnity Company. But those cases are not satis-
factory authorities for the proposition that a liquidated damages clause
for delay retains its enforceability despite the abandonment of the per-
formance of the contract of which it is a part. The point contested and
decided in the Comey case was that a clause limiting the time within
which suit for a particular breach can be brought does not apply where
the contract of which it is a part has been abandoned; while the Mc-
Kegney case is of negligible importance, because the court contented
itself merely with the citation of the Comey case. 6
There exist, however, although not in New York, four decisions hold-
ing the same way as the instant case. 7 In two of these cases, Southern
Pacific Company v. Globe Indemnity Company, and Six Companies of
California v. Joint Highway District No. 13 of State of California, the
courts attempted to justify their departure from the precedent by profess-
ing to see a distinction between the cases with which they were con-
fronted, wherein the owners affirmatively asserted liquidated damages
clauses, and some cases upholding the majority view, where decisions
were rendered against contractors who attempted to defend against
claims for actual damages by pleading liquidated damages clauses, des-
pite the prior abandonment of the contract. But there is no valid dis-
tinction here; for no matter whether owner or contractor asserts the
liquidated damages clause when the contract has been abandoned, the
same considerations apply. To concede the applicability of such a clause
where performance has been abandoned when the owner asserts it and
deny its applicability when the contractor asserts it is to adopt an en-
tirely novel conception of the mutual rights and obligations created by a
contract.
The courts following the view expressed in the decision in the main
case misconstrue the intention of the contracting parties, and are led
to their invocations of liquidated damages provisions of abandoned con-
tracts by an unnecessary eagerness to facilitate the obligee's proof of
damages at the cost of doing violence to the contractual intent of the
5 McKegney v. Illinois Surety Co., 167 N.Y.S. 843 (1917); Comey v. United
Surety Co., 217 N.Y. 268, 111 N.E. 832 (1916).
6 In the McKegney case, the court also mentions as supposed authority for its
holding Kidd v. McCormick, 83 N.Y. 391 (1881), and Morrell v. Irving Fire In-
surance Company, 33 N.Y. 429, 88 Am. Dec. 396 (1865). The inappositeness of
these cases may be judged from the fact that the contracts involved did not even
contain a liquidated damages clause.
7 Southern Pacific Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 21 F. (2d) 288 (C.C.A. 2d, 1927);
Six Companies v. Joint Highway District No. 13, 24 F. Supp. 346 (D.C., N.D., Cal.,
S.D., 1938); Watson v. DeWitt County, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 150, 46 S.W. 1061 (1898);
School District No. 3 of Ford County v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 96
Kan. 499, 152 P. 668 (1915). Also see McCormick, Damages, §155. The court in the
main case also cites Bankers' Surety Co. v. Elkhorn River Drainage District, 214
F. 342 (C.C.A. 8th, 1914), but that case is not in point, the court there having
found that there had been no abandonment of performance.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
parties. This solicitude for the obligee is unnecessary in view of the
fact that actual damages for delayed completion may be incorporated
into the verdict for general damages arising from the total breach with-
out requiring from the obligee much more proof than he is required to
show in order to prove that the liquidated damages clause is not, in fact,
a penalty.
These minority decisions also conjure up for us the spectacle of an
obligor who purposely abandons performance to escape the effect of the
liquidated damages clause for delay. Fortunately, this spectacle does
not, in reality, exist, for there is no contractor who would abandon per-
formance in order to assume the liability of expenses incurred by the
owner in excess of the contract price merely to save himself the rela-
tively small amount of liquidated damages for 'delay. It is obvious that
the amount of the liquidated damages must be small compared with the
cost of the work. Otherwise, in most instances, no court would apply
it because of its penal character. H. P. CoHEN
GRAND JURY--ScEEcY OF PROCEEDINGS-REFUSAL BY WITNEss To TAKE
OATH OF SECRECY AS CONTEMPT.-In a recent case,' the defendant was
subpoenaed as a witness before a federal grand jury then investigating
possible violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. On appearing, the
defendant was tendered the oath of secrecy, to wit: "You do solemnly
swear that you will keep secret the testimony you are about to give be-
fore the grand jury, and that you will testify to the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth." Defendant refused to take such oath because
of the requirement of secrecy contained therein and was held for contempt
under a statute2 which gave the court "power to impose and administer
all necessary oaths" and which also gave it discretionary power to punish
contemptuous disregard of its authority. On appeal the lower court's
judgment was affirmed, the upper court holding that the practice of re-
quiring witnesses before the grand jury to take an oath of secrecy, while
not specifically authorized by such statute, was a logical method of effect-
ing the general policy of secrecy in respect to proceedings before the
grand jury.
The case, apparently one of first impression, reached a result com-
patible with a policy long recognized concerning grand juries. From the
earliest times it has been the policy of the law that the proceedings of
the grand jury should be kept secret,3 and to that end the grand jurors
themselves have always been sworn to keep their own counsel and that of
1 Goodman v. United States, 108 F. (2d) 516 (1939). The defendant was the
daughter and employer of one of the persons whose conduct was under investi-
gation.
2 §268 Judicial Code; 28 U.S.C.A. §385.
3 Clark, Criminal Procedure (2d ed.), 142. See also State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95,
36 Am. Rep. 54 (1879); Jenkins v. State, 35 Fla. 737, 18 So. 182, 48 Am. St. Rep.
267 (1895); Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893); People v. Hulbut, 4
Denio (N.Y.) 133, 47 Am. Dec. 244 (1847); Macklin v. People, 115 Ill. 312, 3 N.E.
222 (1885).
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the State or the King.4 The courts and text writers have advanced vari-
ous reasons for this rule of secrecy.5" At the English common law the
violation of the oath by the grand jurors was both a contempt and a
crime.6 Nowadays in the absence of a special statute providing for a
different punishment,7 a grand juror may be held in contempt for dis-
closing grand jury proceedings to an outsider.8
While every person before the grand jury was bound not to disclose
what took place before the grand jury, it was apparently the English
rule that witnesses were not sworn to secrecy. 9 In this country, the case
authority is divided on the question of whether or not an oath of secrecy
is to be administered to witnesses. In some of the states the adminis-
tration of the oath is required by statute, while in others the practice
has grown up from usage adopted by the courts. So, for example, the
state of Texas by statute10 requires that an oath of secrecy be taken
by grand jurors, bailiffs, and witnesses before the grand jury. In an
early case,1 therefore, the Texas court held that a witness was bound
to keep secret all proceedings in the grand jury room. Similarly the
State of Missouri by statute 12 has also provided that a witness before a
grand jury should be sworn to secrecy, and that a violation of the oath
was properly punishable by the courts. 13 In the second group of states
which have no statute requiring the imposition of an oath, there is
apparently some conflict of authority. Early in New Jersey the court
intimated, in State v. Fish,14 although the problem was not directly in
4 For an example of an oath given to the grind jnu-ors, see Wigmore on Evi-
dence (2d ed. 1923), V, §2360, 146. Substantially the same oath was given by
Justice Field in his charge to grand jury. 2 Sawyer 667, Fed. Cas. No. 118255 (1872).
5 See Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed. 1923) V, §2360, 151, wherein he states the
reasons are four in number, to-wit: (1) security of grand jurors from apprehen-
sion of subsequent disclosure of their opinions and votes, (2) freedom from appre-
hension of future disclosure of complainants and witnesses, (3) to prevent the
guilty accused from being provided with clues so as to assist him in defeating
justice, (4) and freedom of the innocent accused from compulsory disclosure of
the fact that he was falsely accused. See also Clark, Criminal Procedure (2d ed..
1918), 143 et seq.; State v. Broughton, 29 N.C. 96, 45 Am. Dec. 507 (1846); United
States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524 (1917).
6 Blackstone's Commentaries, IV, 1124; Anonymous case, 27 Liber Assisarum
pl. 63 (K. B. 1352).
7 Texas and Missouri appear to have statutes making it a misdemeanor for a
witness to disclose grand jury proceedings. See Rev. Stat. of Mo. 1929, §3518, Texas
Code of Cr. Proc. 1895, Arts. 404, 406, 427. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38,
§720, forbidding grand jurors, officers or other persons from disclosing that an in-
dictment has been found, or is about to be found in certain cases, and forbid-
ding grand jurors alone from other types of disclosure.
8 In re Summerhayes, 70 F. 769 (D.C., N.D., Cal., 1895); United States v.
Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524 (1917).
9 Chitty, Criminal Law, I, 317; 12 R.C.L. 1037.
10 Texas Code Cr. Proc. 1895, Art. 427.
11 Gutgessell v. State, 43 S.W. 1016 (1898). This holding has been reinforced by
later decisions in Misso v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 241, 135 S.W. 1173 (1911); Addison
v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 181, 211 S.W. 225 (1919).
12 Mo. Stat. Ann. 1932, Ch. 29, §§3517, 3518.
Is Ex parte Welborn, 237 Mo. 297 at 309, 141 S.W. 31 (1911).
14 90 N.J. L. 17, 100 A. 181 (1917).
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issue, that a witness before the grand jury was not bound to secrecy,
saying, "A witness before the grand jury is under no legal obligation to
refrain from stating what was said to him and by him while there."
This view was followed in a later case 15 in the same jurisdiction, the
court again in dictum approving the attitude of the court in the previous
case. Opposed to the apparent view of the New Jersey courts is the
view as set out by the Connecticut court in State v. Kemp,'8 wherein it
was held that a witness before the grand jury was required to take an
oath of secrecy notwithstanding the absence of any statute requiring it.
This latter view has been sanctioned in at least thirty-seven federal
districts under the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts, where
it has been the practice, now amounting almost to a custom, to impose
such oaths. 17
Paralleling the diversity in the cases on the question of whether or
not an oath should be imposed, there is a similar division regarding the
right of a witness who testified without taking any such oath to disclose
what transpired at a grand jury investigation. In New York it was
early determined that such witness was not bound to keep the proceed-
ings secret. Thus in People v. Naughton8 it was held that there is no
secrecy imposed upon a witness before the grand jury either as to the
fact of being called before them or as to what he testifies to and that the
only obligation of secrecy imposed was that specifically required by the
oath or statutes. Contrasted with this view is that displayed by the Con-
necticut courts in the case of State v. Fassett.19 In that case the objection
was raised that since the witnesses before the grand jury had not taken
an oath of secrecy they could testify as to what had transpired at the
hearing. In overruling the objection, the court said,20 "Such a practice
would nullify the rule, if it be the object of the law to keep secret the
proceedings before the grand jury it is necessary that the law should
impose silence upon those whom it has compelled to be before them.121
Illinois also apparently follows the view expressed by the Connecticut
court. Thus, in Gitchell v. People,22 the court said: "The same principle
which forbids disclosure by the grand jurors, applies to all persons
authorized by law to be present in the grand jury room." Although the
case did not expressly include witnesses as a member of the group upon
15 State v. Borg 8 N.J. Misc. 349, 150 A. 189 (1930).
16 124 Conn. 639, 1 A. (2d) 761 (1938).
17 Counsel for the government in the principal case in his brief listed 37 such
districts where oaths of secrecy have been imposed on witnesses. Among those
listed is the Northern District of Illinois.
18 38 How. Pr. 430 (N.Y.Ct. of Oyer & Ter. 1870). See also Matter of Osborne,
62 Misc. Rep. 575, 117 N.Y.S. 169 (1909).
19 16 Conn. 457 (1844). 20 State v. Fassett, 16 Conn. 470 et seq. (1844).
21 The Connecticut court in State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 36 Am. Rep. 54 (1879),
approved the Fassett case and followed the rule set down therein. See also Green-
leaf, Evidence, I, §252, 321, wherein he says that the rule of secrecy includes not
only the grand jurors themselves, but their clerk or prosecuting officer if he is
present.
22 45 11. App. 116 (1892), affirmed in 146 Ill. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893); approved in
People v. Goldberg, 302 IMI. 559, 135 N.E. 84 (1922).
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which secrecy is imposed, it seems reasonable to assume that they
would be so included.
23
In reviewing the problem raised by the principal case, it can readily
be seen that the question is one clouded by some uncertainty. The very
meager case authority helps little in determiring what is the prevailing
view. The better view seems to be the one imposing the duty of secrecy,
irrespective of statutory authority. In support of it we have the stringent
policy of the courts, disclosed from earliest time, that the grand jury
investigations should remain secret. Against this we have the problem
of mere inconvenience and hardship on the part of the witness, coupled
with the specious argument that to impose the oath would be violating
the right of free speech, which has long been decided to be a qualified
one.24 The view adopted by the present case is a logical, and often
frequently necessary, extension of the universal rule that grand jurors
ihemselves must swear to secrecy. Considerations of mere convenience
or hardship on the part of the witness should not outweigh the need for
secrecy in respect to grand jury investigations. I. BiENBAUM
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-INJURIES TO PERSONs--REcovERY UNDER BOm
DRAM SHOP LAW AND INJURIEs Acr.-In the case of Hyba v. C. A. Horneman,
Inc.,1 the plaintiffs, who were the parents, and a brother and sister, of
the person deceased brought an action against a dram seller to recover
for injury to their means of support occasioned by the death of their
daughter and sister, Mary Hyba. Mary Hyba died as a result of an acci-
dent alleged to have been caused by the intoxication of one Wilson B.
Lowery, with whom she was riding as his guest. Prior to the institution
of the present action, her father, as administrator of her estate, brought
an action against the said Wilson B. Lowery for her wrongful death,
which action was terminated by a settlement in the nature of a covenant
not to sue. The Supreme Court held that the present action is independent
of the action under the Injuries Act and the outcome therein should have
no bearing on the instant case.
Both the Dram Shop Law and the Injuries Act give rise to actions
which did not exist at common law.
2 The action under the Injuries
Act is not the same action that the injured person could have brought
had he lived.8 It is independent of it except that it may not be brought
23 Newspaper publicity has been held punishable as a contempt in obstructing
justice by violating the secrecy of the grand jury. United States v. Providence
Tribune Co., 241 F. 524 (1917).
24 In the principal case the defendant raised the defense of violation of free
speech, which was dismissed by the court, citing Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919).
1 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E. (2d) 564 (1939).
2 Chicago v. Major, 18 IU. 349 (1857); Dougherty v. American McKenna Process
Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N.E. 619 (1912); Buntin v. Hutton, 260'111. App. 194 (1917).
a The action of the person killed has died with him, and the action for wrongful
death has replaced it. Ohnesorge v. Chicago City Railway Co., 259 Ill. 424, 102 N.E.
819 (1913), in which contributory negligence of the father, suing as administrator
of his infant son's estate, was held to be a bar to his action; Prouty v. City of
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unless an action by the decedent would have lain had he lived.
4 Simi-
larly, in the case of the Dram Shop Law, no remedy existed at common
law against the dram seller for injuries to means of support occasioned
by the intoxication of liquor purchasers.5 However, the fact that the pur-
chaser could bring no action is immaterial, and does not bar a recovery.
6
Contributory negligence of the decedent is a valid defense under the
Injuries Act.7 So also is the contributory negligence of the parties for
whom the action is brought.8 Under the Dram Shop Law, contributory
negligence of the party suing perhaps is not a valid defense;
9 the con-
tributory negligence of the purchaser is, however, no defense.'
0 The
Dram Shop Law is thus more lenient in respect to contributory fault.
In both actions, injury to means of support is an element of dam-
ages." Under the Dram Shop Law, it does not have to be legal support,
but there must be loss of actual support.'
2 In one case the action is
brought by the administrator on behalf of the widow and next of kin;
13
in the other, by the persons injured.' 4 The recovery under the Injuries
Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 95 N.E. 147 (1911). Statute of Limitations in the action for
wrongful death runs from the death of the decedent, not from the time he received
the injury which resulted in his death.
4 This is so by express provision of the statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, §1;
.. and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof ... "
5 Buntin v. Hutton, 260 Ill. App. 194 (1917).
6 The Dram Shop Law, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 43, §135: "Every husband, wife,
child, parent, guardian, employer or other person, who shall be injured in person
or property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of
the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action
in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who
shall, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole
or in part, of such person. No limitation is created as in the Injuries Act,
footnote 4, supra.
7 Newell v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 261 Ill. 505, 104 N.E. 223 (1914).
s Hazel v. Hoopeston Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392, 38 A.L.R.
491 (1923); Ohnesorge v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 259 Ill. 424, 102 N.E. 819 (1913);
Bennett v. Bennett, 252 Ill. App. 333 (1929).
9 This has not been positively decided. Contributory acts go in mitigation of
damages. Reget v. Bell, 77 Ill. 593 (1875); Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873).
Bennett v. Auditorium Bldg. Corp., 299 Ill. App. 139, 19 N.E. (2d) 626 (1939), seems
to hold it a valid defense. Nobody seems quite sure what the case holds. The facts
were complicated by an admission of the plaintiff that she was intoxicated, which
appeared in a pleading (complaint) which was withdrawn. The court in broad
language, in addition to other grounds, held her contributory negligence would
bar a recovery.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 43, §135, footnote 6, supra.
11 Confrey v. Stark, 73 Ill. 187 (1874); Kellerman v. Arnold, 71 Ill. 632 (1874)
(Dram Shop Law). Ittner Brick Co. v. Ashby, 198 Ill. 562, 64 N.E. 1109 (1902);
Chicago & Eastern Ill. R.R. Co. v. Beaver, 199 Ill. 34, 65 N.E. 144 (1902); Goddard
v. Engler, 222 Il. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906); Sutherland on Damages (4th ed.), V,
§1265, p. 4875.
12 Dobler v. O'Connor, 209 Ill. App. 548 (1918).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, I.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 43, § 135. It need not be a legal right of support the
means of which are injured. Dobler v. O'Connor, 209 Ill. App. 548 (1918).
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Act is limited to $10,000.00;15 and only actual damages may be recover-
ed.16 Under the Dram Shop Law, exemplary damages may be recov-
ered where the circumstances warrant, after actual damages have been
shown. 17 Aside from these differences, the measure of damages is iden-
tical in both cases, the Dram Shop Law allowing a greater recovery.
However the actions are based on different powers of the common-
wealth. The Dram Shop Law is based on the police power;18 the In-
juries Act on inherent power to provide remedy for injury. The Statute
of Limitations in the action for wrongful death is one year.19 In the
case of the Dram Shop action, the limit presumably is that of personal
torts, generally two yeais.
In an ordinary case, these differences would be sufficient grounds
for holding the actions to be distinct and independent. It is only in the
case where the purchaser is himself a tort-feasor that any duplication
of actions can possibly arise. In such a case, the intoxicated person can
be sued as well as the dram shop keeper. The actions are independent
in the sense that one action cannot bar the other. This is true because
(1) the rights are given by separate statutes and are founded on dif-
ferent bases, (2) the actions are brought by different persons, (3) the
damages assessed may be greater in one case than in the other. Aside
from these, it is apparent that in some cases, as in the instant case, the
recoveries collected in each action will overlap. That problem was not
considered in the case under discussion. The court relied on Hackett v.
Smelsley,20 an earlier Illinois case. In that case, no action for wrongful
death had been brought, nor could it have been brought because the
action arose from the death of the intoxicated person. The language
relied on therefore merely decided that one could elect to bring a valid
action under the Dram Shop Law rather than an invalid one under the
Injuries Act. This was a natural conclusion.
21
However, where both actions are brought successively, there may
arise the question of double recovery for the same injury. The solution,
had it been argued, might reasonably have been that the recovery in
either action should be mitigated to the extent of the recovery in any
prior action based on the same injury. This principle, analagous to suits
against persons severally liable, ought to be applied in all cases where a
duplication in actions under the Injuries Act and the Dram Shop Law
occur.
15 III. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70.
16 Chicago v. Major, 18 lIL 349 (1857); Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Morris, 26 IMl.
400 (1861); Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410 (1868).
17 Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873); Meidel v. Anthis, 71 11. 241 (1874).
Is O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 N.E. (2d) 878 (1937).
19 See Prouty v. City of Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 95 N.E. 147 (1911).
20 77 Ill. 109 (1875).
21 It must be here noted that no judgment had been given in the instant case in
the action for wrongful death, but the case had been settled by a covenant not to
sue. Apparently, the instant case merely holds that one has a right to elect be-
tween the actions and that the actions are independent and distinct for that pur-
pose. However the language of the decision goes much further.
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Although it is true that the cause of action under the Injuries Act
is single, the respective shares of the widow and next of kin are mathe-
matically ascertainable. 22 Thus if the action for wrongful death is
brought first, and subsequently one or all of the beneficiaries brings an
action under the Dram Shop Law, the amount that he received in the
prior action can easily be deducted from his recovery under the Dram
Shop Law by appropriate instruction to the jury. If the Dram Shop Law
action is brought first, it would seem that because the recovery in an
action under the Dram Shop Law includes every phase of the damages
assessable under the Injuries Act and may even exceed it, the benefici-
ary of the Dram Shop action ought not to receive any share of the re-
covery under the Injuries Act. The inherent difficulty is that the recov-
ery in an action for wrongful death is distributed "in the proportion pro-
vided by law" to the widow and next of kin.23 It is doubtful whether
such a statutory provision could be altered without legislation even
though it be desirable to prevent double recovery. R. RIcHmAN
LANDLORD AND TENANT-FOREuRE OF TERM FOR YEAns-TEA&NT's
"EQurry OF REDEMPTION" AFTER FORFEITURE FOR NONPAYMENT OF RENT.-
The plaintiff-lessee filed a complaint in chancery, alleging the following
facts and asking that the defendant-lessor be enjoined from declaring a
forfeiture of the leasehold estate and from taking any action to recover
possession of the demised premises. Money damages were also requested.
The term extended from October 1, 1937, to September 30, 1940, and the
rent was $4,500, payable in advance in monthly installments of $125. Time
of payment was stated to be of the essence of the agreement. The lease
also gave the tenant an option to renew and contained, among others, the
following provisions: "In case of the non-payment of the rent reserved
hereby, or any part thereof,. . . lessee's right to possession of the demised
premises, thereupon shall terminate, with or without any notice or de-
mand whatsoever, . . . and if the Lessor so elects, but not otherwise, and
with or without notice of such election or any notice or demand what-
soever, this lease shall thereupon terminate .... The acceptance of rent,
whether in a single instance or repeatedly, after it falls due, or after
knowledge of any breach hereof by Lessee, or the giving or making of
any notice or demand, whether according to any statutory provision or
not, or any act or series of acts except an express written waiver, shall
not be construed as a waiver of Lessor's right to act without notice or
demand or of any other right hereby given Lessor, or as an election not
to proceed under the provisions of this lease." The plaintiff paid the rent
installments, sometimes as they came due and sometimes several days
late without any protest from the landlord. On September 6, 1938, the
plaintiff sent a check for that month's rent which the defendant received
22 Rules of intestacy apply to distribution of the recovery under the Injuries Act.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, §2; Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310
Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392, 38 A.L.R. 491 (1923); Bennett v. Bennett, 252 Ill. App. 33$
(1929).
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, §2.
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the next day and retained. On the eighth of September, the defendant sent
to the tenant a purported notice of termination of the leasehold for the
failure to pay the September rent in advance and an invitation to retain
possession of the premises under a month-to-month tenancy at $125 a
month. Thereafter, the plaintiff declared that he retained possession un-
der the original lease. After this declaration, on October 6, the landlord
cashed the check for the September rent. Then he refused the proper
tender of the October rent and served a five day notice for failure to pay
that installment. Within five days, the tenant again tendered the October
rent, which was again refused. Thereafter the November and December
rents were tendered in advance, each tender including all back rent due
at that time. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Illinois
Appellate Court reversed and remanded.'
Where a landlord by express language, or by his conduct, indicates
that prompt payment of the rent will not be required, and where the
tenant, relying on such assurance and before retraction thereof, fails to
pay according to the terms of the lease, the landlord, having waived the
provisions of the lease contract, may not forfeit the lease on that
ground.2 It has been said by the courts that the landlord's failure to
protest late payment of several installments of rent is sufficient assur-
ance to the tenant to justify the invocation of this doctrine,3 but this has
been denied in some decisions, 4 and the cases which have actually held
such inaction to be a waiver have so held in the light of additional facts
which tended to show a course of dealing between the parties which con-
templated tardy payment. 5 This doctrine of waiver proceeds on the
theory that the landlord is estopped to assert the breach of covenant
after having induced it by his promise that he would not enforce the pro-
vision. The rule is an application of promissory estoppel.
6
Where a violation of the lease contract has occurred because rent
was not paid when due, a right of forfeiture may be nullified by subse-
quent events. Tender of the amount due before a required notice of
forfeiture would result in the defeat of the right of termination, 7 and
1 Famous Permanent Wave Shops, Inc. v. Smith, 302 ll. App. 178, 23 N.E. (2d)
767 (1939).
2 Donovan v. Murphy, 217 Ii1. App. 32 (1920).
3 Sixeas v. Fogel, 253 Ill. App. 579 (1929); Donovan v. Murphy, 217 IM. App. 32
(1920); Bernstein v. Weinstein, 220 Ill. App. 292 (1920).
4 McKinney v. Mulvey Mfg. Co., 157 Ill. App. 339 (1910).
5 Donovan v. Murphy, 217 Ill. App. 32 (1920): "In the present case the landlord
saw fit to accept rent for the premises on the 10th day of each month and not
upon the 1st day of the month as provided for in the lease. The tenant was led
to believe, by a course of dealings with the landlord, that payment on the 10th
of the month would be a compliance with the conditions of the lease." Bernstein
v. Weinstein, 220 Ill. App. 292 (1920): "The evidence of . . . one of the defendants,
is that . . . the plaintiff had always said that if he were around the first or
second of the month he (the defendant) could give him a check but, if not, that
he could mail the check .. "
6 Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), III, 1987 et seq., §689.
7 Hopkins v. Levandowski, 250 Ill. 372, 95 N.E. 496 (1911); North Chicago St.
R.R. Co. v. Le Grand Co., 95 Ill. App. 435 (1900).
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tender within the time stipulated in such notice would have the same
effect.8 However, where the lease contains a provision that the estate
shall terminate immediately without notice upon breach of one of the
covenants, such tender, after breach, would be ineffective in a court of
law.9 Furthermore, the landlord may waive his right to terminate after
it has arisen. Where a statutory notice has been given, although none
was required under the provisions of the lease, the landlord is deemed to
have waived his right of termination under the lease, and he may there-
after terminate the tenancy only in accordance with the terms of the
notice.' 0 The acceptance of a tardy tender of rent, in the absence of
some provision in the lease, would be a waiver of the right to forfeit for
the breach in regard to that installment.1'
In equity the landlord's right to forfeit, whether granted by statute
or by lease, has suffered curtailment. Equity will, of course, enjoin an
unwarranted termination by the lessor where there is no adequate remedy
at law. 12 But the doctrine has been extended further, and relief has
been granted against forfeiture for nonpayment of rent where the tenant
was actually in default but where he could show some reasonable excuse
therefore, as for example, that he relied on a void court order.13 The
reason given for such holdings is that equity regards the right of for-
feiture as a security device to enforce the payment of the rent.14 There-
fore, it has been concluded, where the tenant offers to pay the rent and
other costs 15 of the landlord occasioned by the default and where the
tenant has done equity in that his breach was not wilful aRd in that he
has not breached his obligations as a tenant in other ways,' 6 equity
should relieve against forfeiture. There seems to be a tendency to ex-
tend the doctrine to situations where the tenant can show no excuse for
his nonpayment, as long as it was not wilful. 17 Thus it would seem that
8 Chadwick v. Parker, 44 Ill. 326 (1867); Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211 (1868);
Foster v. Rudis, 196 Ill. App. 174 (1915); Sixeas v. Fogel, 253 Ill. App. 579 (1929).
9 McKinney v. Mulvey Mfg. Co., 157 1l. App. 339 (1910).
10 Foster v. Rudis, 196 Ill. App. 174 (1915).
11 Watson v. Smith, 180 Ill. App. 289 (1913); Vintaloro v. Pappas, 310 Ill. 115, 141
N.E. 377 (1923).
12 Watson v. Smith, 180 Ill. App. 289 (1913); Palmer v. Ford, 70 Ill. 370 (1873).
13 Cedrom Coal Co. v. Moss, 230 Ala. 32, 159 So. 225 (1935).
14 Cesar v. Virgin, 207 Ala. 148, 92 So. 406 (1922): "It may be conceded that, in
general, equity will relieve against the forfeiture of a lease for the nonpayment of
rent, the theory being that the covenant for forfeiture on nonpayment is intended
as a mere security, and a forfeiture on that account will be relieved against on
payment of the rent due and damages which the lessor may have sustained."
15 Charles Mulvey Mfg. Co. v. McKinney, 184 Ii. App. 476 (1914), in which the
lessee had to pay: (1) a note plus interest thereon to the landlord; (2) costs of
landlord in his forcible detainer action; (3) costs of the landlord in a suit on the
note; (4) costs of the landlord in suits instituted by him for nonpayment of rent
for several months prior to the forfeiture; (5) costs in the action for a bill to
enjoin.
16 Sunday Lake Mining Co. v. Wakefield, 72 Wis. 204, 39 N.W. 136 (1888); Cesar
v. Virgin, 207 Ala. 148, 92 So. 406 (1922).
17 Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 Ill. 284, 167 N.E. 69 (1929). See
also Rooney v. Crary, 8 Ill. App. 329 (1880).
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an "equity of redemption" from the forfeiture of a leasehold estate for
breach of the obligation to pay rent has been afforded.
An examination of the instant case in the light of these rules estab-
lishes its soundness. The failure to protest the several late payments
was not a waiver of the landlord's right to receive future rent in ad-
vance. Such inaction was insufficient to amount to an assurance that
late payment would be permissible. The giving of the five day notice of
termination would seem insufficient to constitute a waiver of the breach
of the lease contract in view of the provision that such notice should
not be deemed a waiver. And the retention of the tenant's check for the
September rent was not a waiver of the failure to pay that installment
on time in view of the provision in the lease contract that "the acceptance
of rent . . . after knowledge of any breach . . . by Lessee shall not be
considered as a waiver of . . . any . . . right . . . given Lessor." It
must be remembered, however, that the case was presented to a court
of equity, and it is submitted that the above provision was ineffective
to bar the lessee's "equity of redemption" from the forfeiture, any more
than a mortgagor's agreement could cut off his equity of redemption18
and for similar reasons of policy. W. L. ScHL.EE
LANDLORD AND TENANT - INJURIEs Du r To DErmTvE CONDrrION OF
PREMISES-WHETnER EXCULPATORY CLAUsE WILL RELIEVE LANDLORD OF LIABIL-
ITY FOR CONCEALMENT or DEFECT IN DEMISED PRMISES.-In the recent case
of Myron W. McIntyre, Limited v. Chanler Holding Corporation,' the Su-
preme Court in New York County was faced with an old landlord and
tenant principle complicated by an unusual factual situation. The
premises in question were a suite of rooms in a commercial building.
Prior to the plaintiff's tenancy, the landlord concealed a door leading to
an adjoining suite by the simple process of papering it over so that,
to all outward appearances, no door had ever existed there. Its existence
thus was unknown to the plaintiff. The negligence alleged is the renting
of the adjoining space without proper investigation of the tenant, who
gained admittance to the plaintiff's suite through the papered entrance
and removed a quantity of the plaintiff's merchandise.
Plaintiff's lease contained an exculpatory clause, immunizing the
landlord from liability for negligence. The court held that this clause
did not have such effect in the instant case. At the time of the making
of this lease, exculpatory clauses were, in New York as in virtually all
jurisdictions, consistent with public policy, 2 although shortly before this
action was instituted, a New York statute declared such clauses con-
trary to policy and void.3 However, it had already been decided in New
Is Bearss v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16 (1883).
1 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 642 (1939).
2 Kirschenbaurn v. General Outdoor Advertising C~o., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245,
84 A.L.R. 645 (1932); Taylor v. Bailey, 74 Ill. 178 (1874); Hopkins v. Sobra, 152
Ill. App. 273 (1908), and cases therein cited.
s Cahill's Consolidated Laws of N. Y. (1937 Supp.), Ch. 51, §234.
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York that such statute was not to have a retroactive effect. 4 Thus the
issue resolves itself as to whether an exculpatory clause will relieve
this landlord of liability for the negligence and concealment practiced
in the instant case.
Regarding the general effect of exculpatory clauses, the decisions
differ more in verbiage than in result. Some hold that active negligence
on the part of the landlord is not within the protection of the clause;5 other
holdings indicate that passive as well as affirmative negligence on the
part of the lessor may render inoperative such a lease provision;6 and
it is said that patent defects are, and latent defects are not, within the
purview of such clauses. 7 But the general effect may be summed up
in the words of Justice Lehman in deciding the case of Drescher-Roth-
berg Co. v. Landeker,s wherein he states: "It seems to me that this
[exculpatory] clause . . . means simply that the landlord is not to be
liable for damages caused by wear and tear, or inherent defects, or
the action of the elements, although by the exercise of active diligence
he might have prevented such damages; but it does not exempt him from
his liability to repair actual defects, when called to his attention, or
from acts of affirmative negligence." Illinois, it may be said, has fol-
lowed this general line of reasoning in the numerous cases which have
arisen in this jurisdiction on the same matter.9
With regard to the landlord's duty to reveal defects in the premises
to the prospective lessee, the courts seem to be equally in accord. There
is no duty to disclose defects which are patent and discernible upon
reasonable investigation by the prospective lessee. But the landlord is
liable for a failure to disclose defects which are latent and unknown to
the lessee, as where he had not an opportunity of knowing equal to
that possessed by the landlord; the same result obtains where the
defect is latent and the landlord has been guilty of fraud and deceit in
the letting.10
Upon this state of the law, and of the facts in the instant case, it
seems clear that the court could not have reached any result other
than that which it did. For if the exculpatory clause will not protect
the landlord from liability for acts of affirmative negligence, it will cer-
tainly not protect him from liability for fraud or concealment practiced
by him on the propective lessee. M. J. SCHRAM
4 Bernard Katz, Inc. v. East Thirtieth Street Corporation, 16 N.Y.S. 640 (1939).
5 Dickey v. Wells, 203 Ill. App. 305 (1917); Drescher Rothberg Co. v. Landeker,
140 N.Y.S. 1025 (1913); 84 A.L.R. 645 at 659 and cases cited therein.
6 Arling v. Zeitz, 269 Ill. App. 562 (1933).
7 King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 170 S.E. 546 (1933); F. H. Vahlsing, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 108 S.W. (2d) 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Holzhauer
v. Sheeny, 127 Ky. 28, 104 S.W. 1034 (1907); May v. Di Censo, 277 IlM. App. 248
(1934); Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902).
8 140 N.Y.S. 1025 at 1026 (1913).
9 Arling v. Zeitz, 269 Ill. App. 562 (1933); Dickey v. Wells, 203 Ill. App. 305
(1917); Chapman & Smith Co. v. Crown Novelty Co., 175 Ill. App. 397 (1912).
10 Long v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 214 Ill. App. 517 (1919); see also cases
cited in footnote 7 supra.
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STATUTES-TIME FOR ACTION BY EXECuT, -WHETHER TIME FOR APPROVAL
OR DISAPPROVAL RUNS FROM DAY OF PRESENTMENT OR FROM DAY OF ADJOURN-
MENT OF THE LEGISLATURE.-Does the Governor's ten-day period, within
which to approve or disapprove a bill, start to run on the day of present-
ment of the bill to him or on the day of adjournment by the General
Assembly? This question was raised in the cases of People ex. rel.
Petersen v. Hughes and People ex rel. Adelman Heating Corporation v.
Hughes.' Both of the bills in issue were passed on June 30, and on the
same day the General Assembly adjourned sine die. One was presented
to the Governor on July 17 and the veto was filed on July 26. The other
was presented on July 11 and the veto was filed on July 20. The Supreme
Court of the State of Illinois decided that the ten-day period started to
run on the day of presentment to the Governor.
Section 16 of Article 5 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois
provides for the veto power of the Governor and the manner in which
it is to be exercised. Among the provisions of this section are the
following: "Every bill passed by the General Assembly shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor," and "any bill which
shall not be returned by the Governor within ten days (Sundays ex-
cepted) after it shall have been presented to him shall become a law in
like manner as if he had signed it, unless the General Assembly
shall, by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall
be filed with his objections, in the office of the Secretary of State, within
ten days after such adjournment, or become a law.
' 2
The court in the instant case divided bills passed by the General
Assembly into four classes; first, those presented more than ten days
before adjournment; second, those presented on the day of adjournment;
third, those presented less than ten days before adjournment; and,
fourth, those presented after adjournment. The first class, those pre-
sented more than ten days before adjournment, and the second class,
those presented on the day of adjournment, present no problem.
The third class, those presented less than ten days before adjourn-
ment, raises the question as to the effect of adjournment. Does adjourn-
ment start the period running anew from the day of adjournment or
does it continue to run from the day of presentment? If the period
starts anew from the day of adjournment, adjournment would operate
to give the Governor more than ten days after presentment in which
to approve or disapprove a bill. The court states that adjournment
does not have this effect. The ten-day period starts to run on the day
of presentment, and adjournment does not operate to lengthen the
period. The court in arriving at this conclusion relies in part upon
custom, that is, the custom of executives in the past to treat the day of
presentment as the day on which the period starts to run.3
1 25 N.E. (2d) 75 (M., 1940). 2 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 5, §16.
8 People v. Barrett, 370 Ill. 464, 19 N.E. (2d) 340 (1939); Neiberger v. McCul-
lough, 253 Ill. 312, 97 N.E. 660 (1912); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 49 S. Ct.
463, 73 L. Ed. 894, 64 A.L.R. 1434 (1929).
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The fourth class, those presented after adjournment, such as the
bills in issue in the instant case, raise the greatest problem in light
of the constitutional provisions. The constitutional provision requiring
presentation to the Governor of every bill passed by the General
Assembly before it becomes a law is mandatory. 4 The court holds that
the General Assembly can make a presentment after a sine die adjourn-
ment.5 In support of this the court states there is no constitutional
prohibition against making a presentment after adjournment. The Gen-
eral Assembly has the power to fix the date on which a bill shall be
effective, subject to constitutional limitations,6 and this power includes
the power to fix the date of presentment. The court also takes cogni-
zance of the manner in which the General Assembly functions. The
General Assembly, from a practical point of view, could not make a
presentment of all the bills passed on the day of adjournment.
7 Out of
a total of 474 bills passed by the Sixty-First General Assembly, 232 were
passed on the last day of the session. The custom of the General Assem-
bly to make presentment after adjournment is accorded considerable
weight.8
Holding that the General Assembly can make a presentment after
adjournment brings into conflict the constitutional provisions, "within
ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him
• or "within ten days after such adjournment, . . ."9 If the period
starts to run on the day of adjournment, the General Assembly could
by delaying the presentment shorten or do away entirely with the
period within which the Governor is to act. The legislature has no
power to impair the time within which the Governor is to act.10 There-
fore the ten day period within which the Governor is to act starts to
run on the day of presentment to him.
The result in the instant case is a practical one. If the legislature
was allowed to impair or do away with the veto check upon legislative
power, the safeguard intended by the framers of the constitution to
prevent hasty and ill-advised legislation would be nullified."
R. F. RosE
4 People v. Lueders, 283 Ill. 287, 119 N.E. 339 (1918); Neiberger v. McCullough,
253 Ill. 312, 97 N.E. 660 (1912); 25 R.C.L. 888; Hamilton v. State, 61 Md. 14 (1883);
Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518, 70 A.L.R.
1426 (1930); State ex rel. Corbett v. South Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257, 58 A. 759, 54
A.L.R. 339 (1904).
5 See generally, Lankford v. Somerset County, 73 Md. 105, 20 A. 1017, 22 A 412,
11 L.R.A. 491 (1890); Johnson v. Luers, 129 Md. 521, 99 A. 710 (1916); Hartness v.
Black, 95 Vt. 190, 114 A. 44 (1921). Cf. Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615 (1922).
6 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 4, §13.
7 Johnson v. Luers, 129 Md. 521, 99 A. 710 (1916).
8 See note 3, supra. 9 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 5, §16.
10 People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 (1863). Cf. In re Opinions of the Justices, 196 N.E.
260 (1935); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 49 S. Ct. 463, 73 L. Ed. 894, 64
A.L.R. 1434 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 52 S. Ct. 627, 76 L. Ed.
1239 (1932).
11 "As the best means of accomplishing this, and of preventing the adoption of
injurious measures, they [the framers of the constitution] gave to the governor
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TRADs MumS AN TRADE NAvES AND UNFAIR COMPEoTION-JuDIcIAL
RsEviw op FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ORDERS-BASIS FOR EQUITABLE MODIFI-
CATION OF CEASE AND DESIST ORDEaS.-In H. N. Heusner & Son v. Federal
Trade Commission,1 the Circuit Court of Appeals of the third circuit
modified an order of the Commission requiring the petitioners to cease
and desist from using the word "Havana" in the advertising and label-
ing of its cigars, which were actually made of tobacco grown in the
United States. Petitioner asked the court to modify the order so as to
allow use of the word "Havana" in conjunction with appropriate qualifi-
cations, e.g., "Notice.°These cigars are made in the United States and
only of United States tobacco." While rejecting this prayer on the
ground that the two statements were contradictory the court did modify
the order to the extent of allowing the petitioner two years in which to
eliminate the offensive word from its advertising. In stating the reasons
for its decision the court pointed out that the cigars had been labeled
"Havana Smokers" since 1902 and that this called two mitigating factors
into play, first, that "the sudden elimination of the word 'Havana' might
cause confusion or even consternation among the devotees of petitioner's
cigars, as well as substantial loss to the petitioner" and second, that
"it is possible, although the point is not reflected in the findings of the
commission, that the long misuse of the word 'Havana' has lent that term
a species of secondary meaning in connection with petitioner's cigars." In
its conclusion the court stated, "We feel that these considerations, though
without bearing on the propriety of the Commission's order, may well
influence the method whereby it is to be enforced. ... "
The granting by the court of an extension of time in which to
comply with a F.T.C. order is a comparatively new development in
the review of such orders.2 Since the lawmaking of the Federal Trade
Commission flows from adjudication rather than from legislation, its
orders have been subjected to a broader scope of judicial review than
have the orders of legislative tribunals.3 It has been held that what
constitutes unfair competition is for the determination of the court,
and not for the Commission,4 although even this legal question is properly
ten days, exclusive of Sundays, in which to bestow that careful examination and
consideration, so essentially necessary to determine the effects and consequences
likely to flow from the adoption of a new measure. This is the duty imposed, and
it is one that must be performed. And the time allowed for the purpose cannot be
abridged, or the provision thwarted, by either accident or design. The use of the
whole time given to the governor must be allowed." People v. Hatch, 33 IlM. 9 at
136 (1863).
1 106 F. (2d) 596 (1939).
2 Cited by the court as authority for this action is Masland Duraleather Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 34 F. (2d) 733 (1929), in which the court modified
an order forbidding the use of the term "Duraleather-the durable leather substi-
tute" for imitation leather products by granting a six month's period in which
this slogan could be stamped on the product in conjunction with some new in-
offensive trade name.
3 James M. Landis, "Administrative Policies and the Courts," 47 Yale L. J.
519 at 534.
4 15 U.S.C.A. §41 et seq.; American Tobacco Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
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determined by the Commission in the first instance.5 On the other hand,
it is universally held that the determination of questions of fact is for
the Commission and that its findings are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 6 The Supreme Court has expressly stated that the
reviewing court cannot appraise testimony and choose among uncertain
and conflicting inferences.
7
In practice, however, the courts have expanded the field of judicial
investigation on review. This has been accomplished partly through an
interpretation of the powers of the Commission. For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that the F.T.C. should determine whether unfair
competition can be prevented without suppressing long-used trade names
by requiring proper qualifying rules.8 It has also been accomplished
by the decision that the circuit court has the power to search the whole
record for facts not reported by the Commission and to remand to the
Commission for additional findings, or, if justice requires a quick de-
cision, to render its decision without remanding. 9 The courts have also
expanded their field through their function of construction to determine
what questions are those of fact and what are of law or mixed questions
of fact and law.
The growth of the practice by the courts of inquiring into the ex-
pediency of administrative orders on review, as well as the growth of
administrative action generally, has been accompanied by widespread
criticism and comment.10 These discussions stem from a consideration
of the emphasis in government to be afforded administrative action, as
that of a government of men, as contrasted with a stricter adherence
to the tri-partite system of constitutional government, as a government
of laws. Criticism of present-day administrative tribunals ranges from
the loss of constitutional safeguards in the merging of the three branches
9 F. (2d) 570 (1925), affirmed 274 U.S. 543, 47 S. Ct. 663, 71 L. Ed. 1193 (1927);
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S. Ct. 587, 75 L. Ed.
1324 (1931).
5 Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S. Ct.
150, 66 L. Ed. 307, 1 A.L.R. 882 (1922).
6 15 U.S.C.A. §41 et seq. and cases cited.
7 Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 S. Ct. 315,
78 L. Ed. 655 (1934), reversing 64 F. (2d) 618 (1933).
8 Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 1212, 53 S. Ct. 335,
77 L. Ed. 706 (1933); Indian Quartered Oak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 58
F. (2d) 182 (1932), modifying 26 F. (2d) 340 (1928), where the Commission's order
requiring petitioner to desist from designating wood not of mahogany family as
"mahogany" or "Philippine Mahogany" was modified to allow use of the second
term, on a showing of widespread use of the term by the trade establishing a
secondary meaning. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Maisel Trading Post,
79 F. (2d) 127 (1935), modifying 77 F. (2d) 246 (1935); Federal Trade Commission
v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F. (2d) 362 (1935).
9 Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 43 S. Ct. 210,
67 L. Ed. 408 (1928).
10 For a review of the subject as a whole, see James M. Landis, "Administra-
tive Policies and the Courts," 47 Yale L. J. 519; Marvin B. Rosenberry, "Law
and Discretion in Government," 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 514; Robert M. Cooper,
"Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 Yale L. J. 577.
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of government, through the fact that action by such tribunals as the
F.T.C. is remedial rather than preventive to the lack of procedural
standards. Many suggestions have been made for remedying these al-
leged defects, to the end that the functions of the administrative tri-
bunals and the courts may be more clearly differentiated and that con-
stitutional safeguards be more securely established. It has been suggested,
for example, that the discretion of the tribunal should be made more
limited by making standards for administrative action more definite.
Thus it is proposed that opinions and decisions be published and that
these precedents be built up into a system of administrative law cir-
cumscribing their own discretionary powers.1 ' Examining F.T.C. prac-
tice in this light, it is interesting to note that ordinarily the F.T.C. does
not give written opinions-only the findings of fact and the order are
issued. 12 It was early established 13 that the Commission's power to
prevent "unfair methods of competition" was not restricted to acts
which would have been unlawful prior to the act at common law, the
court saying that the words were not void for indefiniteness, since the
trader would still have his day in court, on application for enforcement
of the order, where the principles and tests of the common law were
still applied. 14 The need for definite substandards of vague statutory
standards has been widely recognized. 15 It has been suggested by several
writers that more attention should be paid to the drafting of delegation
of power statutes, and many suggestions have been made for supervision
of reviewing administrative tribunals.
The problem of so forming our administrative agencies so as to
do away with the need for judicial interference in the administrative
function has been aptly epitomized by Professor James Hart, 16 in the
statement, "An ounce of administrative prevention is worth a pound of
11 E. Blythe Stason, "Administrative Tribunals-Organization and Reorganiza-
tion," 36 Mich. L. Rev. 533.
12 See the report of The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure, "The Federal Trade Commission," at Page 63: "The development of
law through the deciding of individual cases is a process both of inclusion and of
exclusion. That is, it is important to understand what is permitted by law, as
well as to know what is forbidden. Not only, therefore, should the Commission
seek to develop a body of precedent based on its holdings that conduct has been
improper, but also it should formulate, for their precedent value, those decisions
which are 'adverse to the complaint.' . . . A narrative statement of the circum-
stances in which a cease and desist order will not be issued would not be in-
appropriate."
13 Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F. 307, 6 A.L.R. 358
(C.C.A., 1919).
14 The court intimated, however, in Gratz v. Federal Trade Commission, that
the words "unfair methods of competition" are "inapplicable to practices not
heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by decep-
tion, oppression, bad faith and fraud or as against public policy because of their
dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create a monopoly.
15 Louis G. Caldwell, "Comments on the Procedure of Federal Administrative
Tribunals, with Particular Reference to the Federal Communication Commission,"
7 George Wash. L. Rev. 740.
16 James Hart, "Some Aspects of Delegated Rule Making," 25 Va. L. Rev. 810.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
judicial cure." Certainly the businessman today in planning his adver-
tising statements or trade names has no standards more definite than
the maze of F.T.C. orders, signed stipulations, and court decrees, upon
which to determine whether his statements will be free from criticism,
and he may place no reliance in stare decisis when he does find fav-
orable authority. 17 Neither can he secure an advisory opinion on his
problem.' 8 Certainly he is protected from abuse of discretion by the
Commission by his right to apply to the court for injunctive relief,
but unless he wishes to incur the cost of expensive litigation, he will be
required to sign cease and desist stipulations which are based not on
establishment by the Commission of the unfair practice alleged but on
information and belief only, since no finding is required before the
issuance of a complaint. In contrast it is interesting to note that under
the anti-trust provisions of the Clayton act, wherein the acts con-
demned are specified, the government must establish the existence of
the combination before issuing the order. In addition, the required
public admission by the businessman that he has been guilty of unfair
methods of competition, which is a necessary consequence of signing
the stipulation, is a live grievance, especially in these days of growing
Consumer Buying groups.
Looking again to the instant case, in light of the foregoing, it is
difficult to criticize the court for relieving the petitioner to the extent of
allowing two years in which to find a more suitable trade name than
"Havana Smokers" for his cigars where for 30 years he has labored to
build his business around this name, even though it might be said
that the exercise of this type of discretion is more properly within the
sphere of the Commission than the Court. D. C. MAcDoNALD
WILLs-WORDs NECESSARY OR SUFICIENT TO CREATE TRuST--CoNSTRUCTION
OF GRANT DiRECTLY TO CHARIABLE CORPORATION W rH REsTRIcTINs.-The New
York Court of Appeals has decided that a charitable corporation cannot
apply the principal of an endowment fund to the payment of a mortgage
where the donor-testator specifies that the income be used for ordinary
expense of maintenance.1
The will disposed of the remainder of decedent's estate to the com-
plainant hospital in common with eight other charitable corporations,
17 Recognizing the hardship thus worked on businessmen the Commission has
started the practice of issuing Trade Practice Rules, based upon Trade Practice
Conferences with members of the trade concerned, for certain key industries
such as furs, silks, rayons and some others. These rules are divided into two
groups. Infractions of the first group constitute violations of fair trade practice
per se. Infractions of the second, the Commission states, may or may not lead
to the issuance of a complaint.
18 The attorney general has declined to give advisory opinions on matters re-
garding the Federal Trade Commission since that Commission alone has power
to enforce the act, 33 Op. Attny. Gen. 225; and the Commission itself has never
given advisory opinions.
1 St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. (2d) 305 (1939), re-
versing 256 App. Div. 120, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 922 (1939).
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using the language "one-ninth to each to be held as an endowment
fund and the income used for maintenance." Complainant's share
amounted to almost $148,000 and its mortgage to $175,000; and, in a
proceeding for a declatory judgment, it claimed the privilege of applying
the principal in part payment of the mortgage indebtedness. The attor-
ney-general as defendant was opposing this action on the ground that
any such use of the principal would be in disregard of the testator's ex-
pressed intention. The hospital claimed that the will created not a trust
but a gift.
Directions for the application of funds in words similar to those
here used have not been given uniform treatment by the courts. Some
courts have said that such language creates a gift in trust.2 Other courts
have found that such words import an absolute gift, and that the direc-
tions bind only the conscience, and not the conduct, of the donee.3 Finally,
it has been suggested that such words create a charitable gift upon
condition, performance of the terms of which can be required by the
proper public official.
4
It has been said that the first theory is untenable since a sole trustee
cannot be sole beneficiary. This objection is unsound, however, in cases
2 Such a case was Hobbs v. Board of Education of Northern Baptist Convention,
126 Neb. 416, 253 N.W. 627 (1934), where a college became insolvent and an attempt
was made to foreclose liens. Said the court, "While it is said in general terms that
to create a trust requires the existence of a donor, a trustee, and a cestul que
trust, there are many cases where charitable trusts have been declared and
enforced, notwithstanding the fact that the trustee and cestui may be the same
entity. .... .
3 In jurisdictions whose statute law opposes perpetual holdings by charities.
courts will frequently construe the words as creating an absolute gift. Thus the
bequest, "I give ... to be used by said church or its trustees in aiding the cause
of home and foreign missions equally," was found to be a gift. Lane v. Eaton,
69 Minn. 141, 71 N.W. 1031 (1897). And in Maryland, whose law permitted no
holdings in perpetuity, the court construed these words, "I further direct that
said body shall hold said fund in trust," as creating a gift. The court indicated,
however, that the beneficiary must keep the fund intact. Charles T. Brandt Inc. v.
Young Women's Christian Association, 169 Md. 607, 182 A. 452 (1936). "Such a
gift, though the corporation may be instructed to maintain the principal intact
and use the income only for a specific purpose, does not create a trust." In re
Donchian's Estate, 120 Misc. 535, 199 N.Y.S. 107 (1923).
4 Thus a bequest, "Moneys . . . be held in trust by the Board of Managers for
the following purposes . . ." was held to be a gift on condition. Woman's Foreign
Missionary Soc. M.E. Church v. Mitchell, 93 Md. 199, 48 A. 737 (1901). Says one
court, "Ordinarily it is of little consequence whether a gift to a charitable cor-
poration for one or more of its corporate purposes be in form a gift outright or a
gift in trust. In either case the corporation holds it upon a trust which may be
enforced through the visitorial power of the state." Dwyer v. Leonard, 100 Conn.
513, 124 A. 28 (1924). Illinois states the converse of the proposition, "The gift or
grant of an estate upon condition or charged with some burden . . . does not
create a trust. . . ." Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Porter, 327 Ill.
28, 158 N.E. 366 (1927). Another court states the rule categorically: "Where the
property is conveyed directly to a corporation to hold for use in the purpose for
which the corporation was created, no trust for the benefit of others arises. .... "
Clark v. Sisters of Society of the Holy Child Jesus, 82 Neb. 85, 117 N.W. 107 (1908).
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where ordinary charitable trust principles are applied.5 New York courts
have said that "gifts to a charitable corporation, though subject to en-
forceable restrictions, do not create a trust in the legal sense." 6 The
suggestion of an absolute gift in the present case is refuted because of
the intent gathered from the use of the word, "endowment." Says the
court, "The term 'endowment' has been defined as the bestowment of
money as a permanent fund, the income of which is to be used in the
administration of a proposed work. ' 7 The court concludes that the use
of this term reflected testator's intention that the principal should be
kept intact.
It has been suggested that such bequests could be considered as
gifts upon condition subsequent, analogous to determinable fees, and that
failure to follow the terms thereof will cause forfeiture. But a gift to
a charitable corporation ordinarily will not lapse and revest in the
settlor or his heirs, s for the purpose of the gift may be enforced on
behalf of the public. 9 The court here seems to conclude that testator
intended a gift on condition, the condition being an ordinary usage of the
income.
The dissenting judges contended that the language following the
words of absolute gift is merely precatory;10 but in so doing they ignored
the force of the word, "endowment." That testator has given complainant
a wide discretion in the use of the income does not support the contention
that he intended an equal latitude in the disposition of the principal.
The decision is reasonable. The testator's intent is manifested by
5 Scott on Trusts, §364.
6 St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. (2d) 305 at 308 (1939).
See also In re Griffin's Will, 167 N.Y. 71, 60 N.E. 284 (1901).
7 St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. (2d) 305 at 306 (1939).
8 People ex rel. Seeman v. Greer College, 302 Ill. 538, 135 N.E. 80 (1922).
9 People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N.E. 944 (1913). See also
note, 62 A.L.R. 881.
10 As may be inferred from any study of the cases, there is practical unanimity
in the result reached or recommended. There is, however, some cleavage in the
interpretation of the words as to whether a trust or gift is created. Two authori-
ties on trusts appear to disagree somewhat in the importance to be attached to
the interpretation. "Occasionally it becomes important to learn whether the
donor intended to make an absolute gift to a charitable corporation to be used
by it for one or more of its corporate purposes, or desired to make the charitable
corporation trustee of a charitable trust. It is clear that there is a distinction in
these two intents and the legal result of their expression. In the first case the
gift is outright and absolute. In the second instance the charitable corporation
takes the bare legal interest. . . ." Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, II, §324, 1031.
"The testator may manifest an intention not to impose a legal obligation upon the
legatee, but to leave him free to apply the legacy to the designated purpose or to
keep it for his own benefit. In such case the legatee takes the legacy beneficially
and the expression of the testator's wish has no legal effect except to promote
litigation." Scott, Trusts, III, 351. Ordinarily discussions on the subject will be
academic, as courts usually favor donations to charity. However, as it may be
seen in the instant case, sometimes the interpretation of the words is very signifi-
cant. See also T. E. Blackwell, "The Charitable Corporation and the Charitable
Trust," 24 Washington U. L. Q. 1; A. Lincoln, "A Question on Gifts to Charitable
Corporations," 25 Virginia L. Rev. 764.
328 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the words, "income" and "endowment." Nowhere does it appear that
the mortgage is impairing the efficient operation of the institution. If
such a situation were made to appear a contrary conclusion might be
justified. 1  J. C. KELiaoG
11 Such a course has been pursued in similar situations where deviation was
deemed advisable. Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. Ed. 502 (1866); Morville v.
Fowle, 144 Mass. 109, 10 N.E. 766 (1887); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v.
Carmody, 211 N.Y. 286, 105 N.E. 543 (1914); Buchanan v. McLyman, 51 R.I. 177,
153 A. 304 (1931).
